B E R K E L E Y ' S    M E T A P H Y S I C S

CONTENTS

1. What are the Mind and the Body?
   1. The mind-body problem
   2. History of the mind-body problem
      1. The ancient world
      2. The Enlightenment
      3. The twentieth century
      4. Now
   3. Genesis of the modern philosophy of mind
   4. Defining terms
      1. Physicalism, mentalism, and dualism
      2. Scope of physicalism and mentalism
      3. Irrealism and solipsism
      4. The term "mind"
      5. The terms "dream" and "hallucination"
2. Theories of Mind
   1. Where is your mind?
      1. Physical things must have a location
      2. Physicalism says the mind is somewhere
      3. Mind has no physical location
         (A 'naive' argument)
      4. Inaccessibility of other minds
   2. Counter-arguments to the naive argument
      1. Do mental sensations exist?
      2. Brain and mind as two 'aspects'
      3. Brain and mind as two 'forms'
      4. Brain and mind as two 'modes'
         (The 'cerebroscope argument')
      5. Mind as an abstraction of brain
      6. Is the mind informational?
   3. Spatial location of mental things
      1. Mental states in overt actions
      2. Intuitive sense of mental location
      3. Location by association
      4. Relative location in perceptual space
      5. Location of causal connection
   4. Dissecting conscious nerve tissue
      1. Is the mind in peripheral nervous tissue?
      2. Does the mind span divisible brain tissue?
      3. Mind travelling in divisible brain tissue
      4. Does the mind span indivisible brain tissue?
      5. Is the mind a quantum state of the brain?
      6. Summary
   5. Minds and computer software
      1. Abstract automata
      2. Mental states versus computational states
      3. Consciousness versus intelligence
   6. Modern theories of consciousness
      1. Reduction, emergence, and dualism
      2. Functionalism and substantism
   7. Functionalism
      1. Creeping androidisation
      2. Integrated whole-brain androidisation
      3. Shared androidisation
      4. A mental monist model
      5. Substantism versus functionalism
   8. Identity theories
      1. Identity theories in general
      2. Type & token identity theories
      3. Continuum of identity theories
      4. Against identity theories
      5. Qualia versus physicalism
      6. Intentions versus physicalism
      7. Qualia versus functionalism
3. Theories of Reality
   1. Physicists' world-view
   2. The physical world is unknowable
      1. Unknowability of physical facts
      2. Physical objects as abstractions
      3. Special features of physical world
      4. Semantic arguments for physical world
   3. The brain-in-a-vat experiment
   4. Truth about the external world
      1. A question within physics
      2. A question of phenomenological utility
      3. A question of literal truth
      4. Literal truth versus physical truth
      5. Does the pictorial language-game matter?
      6. Ryle's spheres of interest
      7. Scientific progress
      8. Conclusion
   5. Berkeley's mental monism
      1. Summary of Berkeleianism
      2. 'Idea' and 'idealism': Bennett's critique
      3. Warnock's critique of Berkeley
   6. Goswami's 'monistic idealism'
      1. The Hard Problem
      2. Self-reference
      3. Quantum mechanics
      4. Attitude
4. Argument for Mental Monism
   1. What is this (really) about?
   2. Mental propositions versus physical propositions
   3. Mental monism and fictionality
      1. Justifying the new formulation
      2. Fictionalism, idealism, and phenomenalism
   4. Fictional things do not (really) exist
   5. Reference versus denotation
   6. What physical assertions (really) refer to
   7. Intrinsic and contingent fictions
   8. The physical world is intrinsically fictional
   9. Summary of the argument
   10. Corollary: consciousness is not physical
   11. What are arguments for?
       1. Style of an argument
       2. Rigour of an argument
       3. persuasiveness of an argument
       4. Conclusion
5. Implications of Mental Monism
   1. Structure of the physical world
      1. Objectivity of fictions
      2. Fictional worlds
      3. Language-games
      4. Subordination of worlds
      5. Natural order of physical world
   2. Structure of the mental world
      1. Perceptual elements
      2. Relations of perceptual elements
      3. Glue and gaps in perceptual fields
      4. Levels of co-mentality
      5. Unity of the mental world
   3. Physical correlates of the mind
      1. Embodied & disembodied mental activity
      2. Psychophysical relationships
      3. Spatial non-specificity of correlates
   4. Volition
      1. Volition versus determinism
      2. Pragmatic refutation of anti-volitionism
      3. What is causation?
      4. Random behaviour
      5. Meaningful random behaviour
      6. Purposive non-deterministic behaviour
      7. Feedback in purposive non-determinism
      8. Speculations
6. A Berkeleian Model of the Mind
   1. The metamind
   2. Experientia
   3. Experiential operations
   4. The metaverse
   5. Individuation of ordinary minds
   6. Metamental objects
   7. Time
   8. Structure of metamental objects
   9. Ultimate unity of agency
   10. How can we talk about the mind?

© Peter B. Lloyd, 1999. Last modified 28th February 2000.

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